## CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED

VIA:	Air (SPECIFY AIR OR S	SEA PO (CH)	SECOTY INFORMATION	. PATCH NO.	<b>3</b> -1336
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Chief, WHD

RYBAT

DATE: 7 August 1953

FROM :

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
SUBJECT: GENERAL-

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PBFORTUNE

- 1. Upon my return to Fort Amador from the interior the afternoon of 31 July 1953, I immediately called Richard F. Arville, asking what I could do or might have done to assist him regarding the trouble experienced by the LCFANGLED. Arville filled me in on the background and indicated quite frankly that he did not know. We agreed it would be wise for me to play this incident down as much as possible; and that it would be well for me to tell the interested officials in the Command, on a need-to-know basis if asked, that this was an empty LCFANGLED engaged in a routine training trip to check out the engines, etc.
- 2. I then contacted Captain Henry J. Armstrong, USN, AC of S, J-2, who stated that Lt. General Horace L. McBride had gone through the overhead; that the general thought our cover here was gone as a result of this incident; that he was alarmed to learn our signal personnel had gone on the air in direct communication with LCFANGLED; that the general felt he should know if someone within his command is running around in an LCFANGLED. I offered to see the general immediately; but, as it turned out, the military had golfing dates, and Armstrong sent me word later in the evening that the general would see me at 0900R on 3 August 1953.
- 3. At the appointed time, Armstrong and I met with Brigadier General Martin F. Hass, Chief of Staff, Caribbean Command. Hass stated General McBride was embarrassed and griped to think we had not told him we had an ICFANGLED at DTROBALO and briefed him as to what it was doing. I told him we assumed everybody knew about the ICFANGLED, since it had been tied up at DTROBALO for several months without arousing any unusual interest; that from a security point of view, as outlined in AR 380-5, there was in effect no real need for him to know the details; and that the ICFANGLED was engaged in one of several training trips which it has been making and would have been of no interest to him had it not met with bad climatic conditions. General Hass talked and talked, but gradually calmed down. I think he is not unduly disturbed. He asked me to be sure to tell Armstrong the next time we contemplate another trip of this nature and also to keep him informed if we were using any airplanes under unusual or similar circumstances.
- 4. I then called on Captain G. W. Patterson, Jr., USN, Chief of Staff, 15th Naval District. I had been in extensive contact with Patterson the night of



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## SECURITY INFORMATION

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31 July, pressuring him into sending an ODOATH LCFANGLED to help our LCFANGLED. I also talked to him at length on the morning of 1 August. When I saw him on 3 August, he was under control but still had not fully calmed down. He obviously resented that C.N.O. in Washington had been appealed to for assistance. He told me such action was not necessary. He did not buy the story that the LCFANGLED was on a routine training mission, checking out its engines, etc. He said he had been through the area where the LCFANGLED broke down on three occasions, and it was one of the last places in the Caribbean for any reasonable skipper to go on a training or shakedown trip. He stated in substance, "You know, Zac, that crew was on a secret operation in the area, and I have been cleared for Top Secret - you should be able to tell me." I told Patterson so far as I knew the LCFANGLED was on a routine shakedown training trip. I asked him whether he wanted me to see Admiral Bledsoe. But it was obvious, when Patterson learned I could not give him any information, he saw no need for me to talk with the admiral. He said the admiral was going to write a letter to the C.N.O. about this incident. I offered to see the admiral at any time, but have not heard from him and therefore assume he does not want to see me.

- 5. At the completion of our interview, Captain Patterson stated he wanted to know in advance of any future proposed trips by our present or any future LCFANGLED with complete details as to what was going on. I told him I could make no commitment, but would inform Headquarters of his wishes. I also reminded him that under security regulations there was no real need for him to know details of our activities. Patterson is friendly toward me; however, he seems very nosy on this issue. Incidentally, I also told Patterson that Arville had kept ODOATH well informed by dealing with the C.O. at Coco Solo on a day-to-day basis. Patterson made it clear that he was running the 15th Naval District and not the C.O. at Coco Solo.
- 6. I personally arranged to have contacted all Public Information officers here for the purpose of having any inquiry regarding the LCFANGLED squashed or played down. Apparently none of them have had any inquiry.
- 7. The foregoing is set forth for your information and whatever action may be deemed appropriate. It would appear to me that we shall have to give Navy and Caribbean Command at least unofficial advance notice of any future trips of this nature if we are going to avoid ill will and possible publicity.

ZTC/mtj

7 August 1953

Zachary T. Cady

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